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JAMEs DOUGLAS WILLIAM CROWDUS
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
E. B. CONANT
THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN
MISSOURI TO LICENSE, TAX AND REGULATE
TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
I.
The Constitution of Missouri (1875, Article X, Section 1)
authorizes the General Assembly to delegate the taxing power
to municipal corporations, to be exercised for corporate pur-
poses. That section is as follows:
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"The taxing power may be exercised by the General As-
sembly for State purposes, and by counties and other numi-
cipal corporations, under authority granted to them by the
General Assembly, for county and other corporate purposes."
Pursuant to that authority the General Assembly has, by
various acts, granted authority to all cities in Missouri to
license, tax and regulate telephone companies.
Cities of the First Class have been invested with that power
by section 7674, R. S. Mo. 1919 (8588, R. S. 1909), which pro-
vides:
"The mayor and common council shall have the power with-
in the city, by ordinance, not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion or any law of this state or of this article: . . . .XVI.
To license and tax telegraph companies, telephone companies,
electric light companies, street railway companies, gas com-
panies, conduit companies, subway companies, heating com-
panies, cold storage and refrigeration companies and power
companies. ..
"XVII. To license, tax and regulate telegraph companies,
. . . .poles and wires or conduits and wires of telegraph,
telephone, electric light, street railway and electric and power
companies; ..... and to fix the license tax to be paid there-
on or therefor; and in the exercise of the foregoing powers,
to divide the various occupations, professions, trades, pur-
suits, corporations and other institutions and establishments,
articles, utilities and commodities into different classes; and
to impose a separate license tax for each place of business
conducted or maintained by the same person, firm or cor-
poration."
Cities of the Second Class are given the power, in section
7975, R. S. Mo. 1919 (Laws Mo. 1917, p. 357), by ordinance,
. . . . "XVII. To license and tax telegraph companies,
telephone companies, electric companies. .... .. and util-
ities of whatsoever name or character, like and unlike.
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"XVIII. To license, tax and regulate . ... poles and
wires, or conduits and wires, of telegraph, telephone, .
and power companies..... .and all . . . . corporations
.... not heretofore enumerated. . . . The city may
charge a separate license tax for each place of business con-
ducted or maintained by the same person, firm or corpora-
tion. " I
Cities of the Third Class. As to these, section 8322, R.
S. Mo. 1919 (Laws Mo. 1917, §9253, page 373) provides that
"the council shall have power and authority to levy and
collect a license tax on . . . . telephone companies. . "
For Cities of the Fourth Class, section 8497, R. S. Mo. 1919
(§9399 R. S. 1909) provides that "the mayor and board of
aldermen shall have power and authority to regulate and to
license, and to levy and collect a license tax on . . . . tele-
graph companies, telephone companies. . .
The towns and villages in Missouri have not thus far been
given power to license, tax or regulate telephone utilities or
other classes of business.
City of St. Louis. The constitution of 1875 authorized the
City of St. Louis to adopt, by vote of the electors, its own
charter, the provisions thereof to be in harmony with and
subject to the State Constitution and the laws of the State,
but reserving to the General Assembly the same power over
the City of St. Louis that it has over other cities in this
State. (Const. Mo., Article IX., sections 20, 23 and 25.)
In pursuance of such authority the City of St. Louis in 1876
adopted a charter which remained in force until August 29,
1914, when the present charter, adopted by the people in
June, 1914, took effect. The present charter provides, Ar-
ticle I, section 1, that said City "shall have power . . ..
(23) to license and regulate all persons, firms, corporations,
Washington University Open Scholarship
POWER OF MUNICIPALITIES TO TAX TELEPHONE COMPANIES. 143
companies, and associations engaged in any business, occu-
pation, calling, profession, or trade.
"(24) To impose a license tax upon any business, vocation,
pursuit, calling, animal, or thing. . "
And Article XX. thereof provides that "license taxes may
be imposed by ordinance upon . . .. telephone companies,
telegraph companies; . . .. and a separate license tax may
be imposed for each place of business conducted or maintained
by the same person, firm or corporation."
In view of the broad grants of power by the General As-
sembly to municipal corporations to impose license taxes, or
to license, tax and regulate public utilities, as above set forth,
and the manner in which such municipal corporations have
exercised those powers, the question presents itself whether
this taxing power, which the Constitution says the General
Assembly may thus delegate, has reference only to the ad
valorem taxes to be collected by cities for maintenance of the
city governments, over and above all other state taxes, or did
the framers of the Constitution also intend thereby that the
General Assembly might grant municipal corporations the
right to license, tax and regulate trades, professions, voca-
tions, etc., not merely for the purpose of police regulation, but
for the purpose of raising revenue as well.
At the time the Constitution was adopted it is not believed
that in using the words "taxing power," it was ever contem-
plated that license taxes would be imposed by cities upon
various trades and professions. What they did contemplate
was that municipalities would have to be supported by some
tax and they, therefore, made another provision that cities
might collect ad valorem taxes on property over and above
such taxes as were imposed by the State.
This was particularly true prior to 1875. The Constitu-
tion does provide in Section 22, Article X. for a special road
and bridge tax and for the manner of its assessment, but
that is a later provision, adopted by amendment in 1908.
Section 21, Article X, was adopted in 1875 and provides for
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a fee to be paid into the treasury upon organizing a corpora-
tion and the fee is to be graduated according to the amount
of capital stock.
Another section of the Constitution of 1875, (Art. X, Sec-
tion 5) provides for taxing railroad corporations in following
terms:
"All railroad corporations in this state or doing business
therein shall be subject to taxation for state, county, school,
municipal, and other purposes, on the real and personal prop-
erty owned or used by them and on their gross earnings, their
net earnings, their franchises, and their capital stock."
With this provision in the Constitution, it is clear that the
General Assembly may grant to a municipal corporation the
right to tax railroad corporations upon their gross earnings,
their net earnings, their franchises, and their capital stock.
Although no provision is contained in the Constitution
authorizing the General Assembly to grant to cities the right
to use the power of taxation to impose license taxes generally
upon various trades, professions and vocations, it must be
conceded that the General Assembly has the power without
sudch a provision, because it is well settled that State Consti-
tutions are restrictions of power and the General Assemblies
have the power to pass any laws that are not in derogation
of provisions of the State constitutions and the Constitution
of the United States. In considering the Constitution of the
United States the very reverse of this proposition is true as
it is a delegation of power, and Congress can only pass such
laws as may be expressly authorized or implied from the
Constitution.
The only question that might arise is whether a license
tax is a tax upon property. The law is well settled that it
is a tax upon a privilege connected with property and is not a
direct tax upon property. This is so well settled that no deci-
sions are being quoted. Therefore, provisions of the Consti-
tution with reference to ad valorem taxes do not apply when
license taxes are in question.
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11.
Provisions in the constitution of Missouri with reference
to the uniformity of taxation do not apply to license taxes,
and the license tax is not a tax upon property but upon privi-
leges connected with property.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution of Missouri, is
as follows:
TAXES FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES MUST BE UNIFORM.
"Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes
only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax,
and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws."
In City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468, the Court
said, 1. c. 474:
"It is therefore a mistake to suppose that the constitu-
tional provisions in question include every species of taxa-
tion. These provisions as to equality and uniformity of tax-
ation apply to property alone, not to taxes on privileges or
occupations, or on the exercise of a civil right.
"The substance, not the form of the tax, is to be regarded
in ascertaining whether the tax is upon property or upon a
privilege connected with property. The tax under consid-
eration is a license tax. The imposition of such a tax may
be referred to the taxing power or to the police power of
the State,-to either or to both; to the police power alone
if the object is merely to regulate, and the amount received
merely pays the expense of enforcing the regulations, and
to the taxing power alone if its main object is revenue."
That case was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 70 Mo.
562, and the above language fully approved.
In Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479, the Court, on page 491,
said:
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"The Constitution enjoins .a uniform rule as to the imposi-
tion of taxes on all property, but does not abridge the power
of the Legislature to provide for a revenue from other
sources. It was intended to make the burdens of govern-
ment rest on all property alike-to forbid favoritism and
prevent inequality. Outside of the constitutional restric-
tion, the Legislature must be the sole judge of the propriety
of taxation, and define the sources of revenue as the exigency
of the occasion may require. The income tax was uniform
and equal as to the classes upon whom it operated; it did not
come within the meaning of the term 'property' as used and
designated in the Constitution, and I think it was not in con-
flict with any provision of that instrument."
This was also upheld in City of St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69
Mo. 301.
In Kansas City v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 451, the Court
said on pages 456-7:
"The defendant insists that the license tax required by the
present ordinance is a tax upon personal property. To this
insistence we can not yield our assent, for the reason that
we think the law is now well settled, at least as far as we are
concerned, that it is a license tax on a privilege connected
with property, and not upon the property. And though im-
posed for revenue, it is a tax in the nature of a license, be-
cause it is a permission to do that which, after the passage
of the ordinance, it became unlawful to do without having
first obtained the permission. (St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo.
App. ante; s. c. 70 Mo. ante.) And since the said license tax
is upon a privilege connected with property and iot upon
properity, the argument that the ordinance is violative of
section 4, article 10 of the Constitution, is without force."
In St. Louis v. United Railways, 263 Mo. 387, the Court
said in speaking of the mill tax imposed by an ordinance of
of the City of St. Louis, at pages 448-9:
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"Defendant also contends that the ordinance violates sec-
tion 3, article 10, Constitution of Missouri, requiring uni-
formity of taxation. This question was directly before the
Supreme Court of the United States in the hearing upon the
bill in equity, made so not only by the agreed statement of
facts between the parties, but in the allegations of the bill.
In passing upon this question the court (p. 279) said: (210
U. S. 279).
" 'In the fixing of a license tax upon all companies alike
for the privilege of using cars in the city, it is exerting other
charter powers. It makes provision uniformly applicable to
all persons or companies using street cars. It is a revenue
measure equally applicable to all coming within its terms.
We do not perceive that the exercise of the power to grant
privileges in the streets in making terms with companies
seeking such rights, in the absence of plain and unequivocal
terms to that effect, excludes the city's right to impose the
license tax under the power conferred for that purpose.'
"The United States Supreme Court's language is, without
comment, a sufficient answer to the futility of this conten-
tion. If it were not, it has been held in St. Louis v. Green,
7 Mo. App. 468, which case has been affirmed as to this point
in 70 Mo. 562, that the constitutional provision as to uni-
formity of taxation does not include license taxes. This
doctrine has also been approved in Glasgow v. Rowse, 43
Mo. 489; St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 302. These cases
hold that the purpose of the constitutional provision claimed
by defendant to be violated by this ordinance, was to prevent
discrimination between objects belonging to the same class;
that this organic provision was not intended to include every
species of taxation, and that it is restricted in its applica-
tion to property alone, and has not, and was not intended
to have, any application to licenses or taxes on privileges
or occupations or on the exercise of civil rights. (Kansas
City v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 1. c. 455."
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The cases Brookfield v. Tooey, 141 Mo. 619, Kansas City
v. Grush, 151 Mo. 128, and State ex rel. v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo.
375, have been cited as holding that a license tax to raise
revenue must conform to this section of the Constitution.
However, that is not true of Brookfield v. Tooey, supra, in
which the Court said (page 625):
"In a word, can this tax of one per cent upon the cash
value of the goods on hand be upheld as an occupation or
privilege tax? After a careful investigation of the question
mooted and most ably discussed by counsel, it seems palpa-
ble that this is a property tax, pure and simple. It is an
obvious misnomer to call it a tax upon occupation. While
cities of the third class may exact a license tax upon occupa-
tions or callings, the tax thus enacted must be upon the privi-
lege itself, and not a plain ad valorem tax upon property
as this ordinance levies. We are firmly convinced that this
tax cannot be held to be other than a direct tax upon prop-
erty. It is therefore in direct disobedience of sections 3
and 11 of article X of the Constitution of Missouri, because
it is not uniform upon all the personal property in said
city, * * "
In Kansas City v. Grush, supra, the Court said on page
134, in passing on a Kansas City ordinance requiring meat
shops in one section of the city to pay $100.00 license tax
and meat shops in another part of the city to pay a $25.00
license tax:
"That the license fee which the city seeks to compel de-
fendant to pay is a tax does not admit of doubt. On its face
it is perfectly apparent that the purpose of the ordinance
is to raise revenue and when this is the case it is a tax and
must conform to the requirement of section 3, article X of
our Constitution, which provides that taxes 'shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax. ' "
148
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In State ex rel. v. Ashbrook, supra, the Court held that
an Act requiring merchants in various cities to pay license
fees was a tax for the purpose of raising revenue and was
unconstitutional because it violated the provision of uni-
formity in the Constitution.
The distinction has been made that when a license tax is
for the purpose of raising revenue and not a regulatory fee,
the constitutional provision as to uniformity will apply; but
when it is simply a regulatory tax, the constitutional provi-
sion does not apply. The Court further held that a license
tax may be a regulatory tax, or a tax for raising revenue,
or a combination of both at the same time. At best it seems
to be a decidedly mixed question of law. The last decision
on the question by the Supreme Court of Missouri is St.
Louis v. United Railways, supra. Note language quoted.
In the first paragraph the United States Supreme Court is
quoted as holding the tax a revenue measure, and the second
paragraph holds the constitutional provision does not apply
as to uniformity. The United States Supreme Court said
the mill tax ordinance was uniform upon those who were
to pay the tax, but it did not say that it complied with the
provision of the Constitution or that it must comply with
the uniform provision.
The weight or authority seems to be that it is not a tax
upon property but a license tax upon privileges connected
with property and that the provision as to uniformity does
not apply. However, if a license tax were imposed by ordi-
nance for some purpose which was not a public purpose, and
the matter came up before the Supreme Court as to whether
the first sentence of that section of the Constitution applied,
the Court would in all probability find itself in an embar-
rassing position.
D.
The rental theory must not be confused with license or
privilege taxes. The authority to rent portions of the street
to a telegraph or telephone company or other public utility
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for the purpose of placing poles, is not derived from the
taxing power, but is an inherent right which the city has
and exercises in the same way that a public building owned
by the city is rented. It is a regulation of the use, the use
being in the city. Such a right is exceptional and extraordi-
nary and applies only to the city of St. Louis by reason of
the peculiarities of its charter. The power to rent portions
of the streets in the case of a telephone or telegraph corpo-
ration applies strictly to foreign corporations, since domes-
tic telephone and telegraph companies are given the right
by statute to place their poles along and across the public
streets and highways of the state.
In City of Plattsburg v. People's Telephone Co., 88 Mo.
App. 306, the Court said on page 312, with reference to a
license tax of two per cent assessed upon the gross receipts
of the defendant telephone company:
"We regard our views of this question as sustained by
the Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. v. St. Louis,
145 Mo. 551. That case concerned the making of ways and
the laying of wires beneath the surface of the streets, but
the discussion of the principles of law involved embrace this
case. By the terms of section 1251, article 6, Revised Stat-
utes 1899, telephone and telegraph companies are given the
right to set their poles and string their wires in the streets
of cities, to place their wires beneath the surface. While
it is necessary to obtain the consent of a city to place wires
under the surface at all and is not necessary (unless as to
which particular street) to obtain such consent above the
surface, it might be thought that a charge could well be made
for the use where consent is necessary and could not be made
where the right exists without such consent. But in the lat-
ter instance, while the right exists without consent, it is a
right (like many others) subject to regulation, and the power
to regulate includes the power, not to prevent, but to impose
conditions such as a money charge. And so it was held in
150
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St. Louis v. Telegraph Company, 148 U. S. 92; s. c., 149 U. S.
465.
"The sum agreed upon in this case, viz., two per cent of
the gross earnings of the plant, is not a tax on the property
of defendants. It is a sale or rental of necessary portions
of the streets of the city for a specified time, for the purpose
of carrying on a business in which defendants had a right
to engage. And it makes no practical difference what the
contract of sale or rental may be called by the parties,
whether a franchise or other name, so long as its scope does
not reach outside and beyond the power of the municipality."
It is interesting to note in connection with this case that
the Peoples' Telephone Company was a partnership and Sec-
tion 3326, of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, which
starts out "companies organized under the provisions of
this article," would not apply to the Peoples' Telephone
Company because they are not organized under the provi-
sions of the article.
In City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Company,
148 U. S. 93, 37 L. Ed. 383, the defendant, a foreign corpora-
tion, had refused to pay a license tax of five dollars per pole
on all poles in the City of St. Louis. The Supreme Court
said:
"And, first, with reference to the ruling that this charge
was a privilege or license tax. To determine this question,
we must refer to the language of the ordinance itself, and
by that we find that the charge is imposed for the privilege
of using the streets, alleys, and public places, and is gradu-
ated by the amount of such use. Clearly, this is no privilege
or license tax. The amount to be paid is not graduated by
the amount of the business, nor is it a sum fixed for the
privilege of doing business. It is more in the nature of a
charge for the use of property belonging to the city-that
which may properly be called rental. * * * If, instead
of occupying the streets and public places with its telegragh
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poles, the company should do what it may rightfully do, pur-
chase ground in the various blocks from private individuals,
and to such ground remove its poles, the section would no
longer have any application to it. That by it the city re-
ceives something which it may use as revenue, does not de-
termine the character of the charge nor make it a tax. The
revenues of a municipality may come from rentals as legiti-
mately and as properly as from taxes. Supposing the city
of St. Louis should find its city hall too small for its pur-
poses, or too far removed from the center of business, and
should purchase or build another more satisfactory in this
respect; it would not thereafter be forced to let the old re-
main vacant or to immediately sell it, but might derive rev-
enue by renting its various rooms. Would an ordinance
fixing the price at which those rooms could be occupied be
in any sense one imposing a tax? Nor is the character of
the charge changed by reason of the fact that it is not im-
posed upon such telegraph companies as by ordinance are
taxed on their gross income for city purposes."
Upon a rehearing in the same case, the Court said, 37 L.
Ed. 810, 145 U. S. 465:
"And so it is only a matter of regulation of use when the
city grants to the telegraph company the right to use exclu-
sively a portion of the street, on condition of contribuiting
something towards the expense it has been to in opening and
improving the street. Unless, therefore, the telegraph com-
pany has some superior right which excludes it from sub-
jection to this control on the part of the city over the streets,
it would seem that the power to require payment of some
reasonable sum for the exclusive use of a portion of the
streets was within the grant of power to regulate the use.
That the company gets no such right from the general gov-
ernment is shown by the opinion heretofore delivered, nor
has it any such from the state. The law in force in Missouri
from 1866 gives certain rights in streets to 'companies or-
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ganized under the provisions of this article.' Of course,
the defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of
the state of New York, can claim no benefit of this."
It seems the Supreme Court in the first instance upheld
the license tax as being a rental charge for use of the street
and was relying on section 10 of the scheme authorized by
the Constitution, in addition to the charter for enlarging the
boundaries of the city and adjusting the relations between
the city and the county. The section was quoted by Judge
Brewer in his opinion and is as follows:
"See. 10. All the public buildings, institutions, public
parks, and property of every character and description, here-
tofore owned and controlled by the county of St. Louis
within the limits as extended, including the court house, the
county jail, the insane asylum, and the poor house, are
hereby transferred and made over to the city of St. Louis,
and all the right, title, and interest of the county of St. Louis
in said property, and in all public roads and highways wtthin
the enlarged limits, is hereby vested in the city of St. Louis,
and divested out of the county; and in consideration of the
city becoming the proprietor of all the county buildings and
property within its enlarged limits, the city hereby assumes
the whole of the existing county debt and the entire park
tax." 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, p. 1565.
It has been noted by several textbook writers and it seems
to be a very just criticism that the County of St. Louis never
had a fee in the streets. It only had an easement for the
use of a road or street and a transfer of all the right, title
and interest would only pass such right, title or interest as
the County of St. Louis had, or, in other words, an easement.
Further along in the opinion, 37 L. Ed. 813, the Supreme
Court said:
"The power of the city to devote the streets or public
grounds to purely private uses was denied; but in the .cases
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of Julia Bldg. Asso. v. Bell Teleph. Co., 88 Mo. 258, and AS'.
Louis v. Bell Teleph. Co., 2 L. R. A. 278, 96 Mo. 623, it was
expressly' held that the use of the streets for telephone poles
was not a private use (and of course telegraph poles stand
on the same footing) and that a private corporation carry-
ing on the public service of transportation of messages
might be permitted to use the streets for its poles. Counsel
rely strongly upon the latter of these cases, in which the
power of the city to regulate the charges for telephone serv-
ice was denied. But obviously that decision does not cover
this case. The relations of a telephone or telegraph com-
pany to its patrons, after the use of the streets has been
granted, does not affect the use, and power to regulate the
use does not carry with it by implication power to regulate
the dealings between the corporation having such use and
its individual patrons; but what the company shall pay to
the city for the use is directly involved in a regulation of the
use. The determination of the amount to be paid for the
use is as much a matter of regulation as determining the
place which may be used or the size or height of the poles."
In Julia Building Ass', v. The Bell Telephone Company,
88 Mo. 258, in addition to holding that telephone poles were
not an additional servitude upon the streets and highways,
it was held that the abutting owners were owners in fee of
the streets. The Court said on page 267:
"Under the above state of facts it may be conceded that
inasmuch as the plaintiff is the owner in fee of the land
abutting on Sixth street, that it is under the laws in force
in 1816, also the owner in fee to the centre of said street.
While this is so, such ownership is subject to all the uses to
which such street can be properly devoted under the dedi-
cation made by Chouteau and Lucas in 1816. 'When one
claims land as being part of a street adjoining the premises
described in his deed, he cannot also insist that the land is
not subject to a servitude as such street. It is only by as-
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suming that it is a street, that he acquires any title to the land
therein. And being a part of the street his title is subject
to the easement over it.' "
Since poles are not an additional servitude to the streets,
it cannot be seen how they could interfere with the easement
possessed by the city and it should only be a question of time
until the rental theory is overruled. It must be admitted
that a license fee can be collected in the nature of a regula-
tory measure but when the courts attempt to base a license
fee upon a rental theory, it is beset with difficulties.
It is observed that the Judge in rendering his opinion
stated that Lhe Western Union is a foreign corporation and
has not the same rights as possessed by domestic corpora-
tions to occupy streets under Section 3326, of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, 1909, (R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 10132),
which provides:
"Companies organized under the provisions of this arti-
cle, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining tele-
phone or magnetic telegraph lines, are authorized to set their
poles, piers, abutments, wires, and other fixtures along,
across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters
of this state, in such manner as not to incommode the public
in the use of such roads, streets and waters: Provided, any
telegraph or telephone company desiring to place their wires,
poles and other fixtures in any city, they shall first obtain
consent from said city through the municipal authorities
thereof."
This section was first enacted in 1866, or prior thereto, as
it appears in the General Statutes of 1866, Chapter 65, Sec-
tion 5. The section as there found ends with the word
"waters" and does not contain the word "telephone," and
it applied originally only to telegraph companies and did not
confer any authority upon cities to permit or deny the use
of city streets to telephone companies.
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Since the opinion of the Supreme Court applies to for-
eign corporations and does not apply to domestic corpora-
tions, no precedent is established binding upon telephone
corporations spoken of in Section 3326. The decision in the
case City of Plattsburg v. Peoples' Telephone Company,
supra, was based entirely upon the decision rendered in the
case of St. Louis v. Western Union, and it is plainly appar-
ent the facts were such that the decision in the Western
Union case did not apply because-
First, there is absolutely no basis upon which to predicate
an assumption that the city of Plattsburg owned a fee in the
streets. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of
Hodges, City Tax Collector of Meridian, v. Western Union
Teleg. Co., 72 Miss. 912, has expressly pointed out that the
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court can apply to the city of
St. Louis alone by reason of the peculiarities of its charter.
The language, as used by the Court, was as follows:
"The ground upon which the ordinance of the city of St.
Louis, of which the one in this case is said to be a copy, is
placed in 148 U. S. 92, and 149 U. S. 465, is that the city of
St. Louis is the absolute owner of fee in its streets; and the
charter powers of the city are 'self appointed.' It is ex-
pressly declared that St. Louis occupies a 'unique position.
It does not, like most cities, derive its powers by grant from
the legislature, but it framed its own charter under express
authority from the people of the state given in the constitu-
tion,' and again it is said, 'this charter is an organic act,
so defined in the constitution, and is to be construed as or-
ganic acts are construed. The city is in a very just sense
an imperium in imperio. The powers are self-appointed
and the reserve control existing in the general assembly
does not take away this peculiar feature of the charter.'
Treating the city, therefore, as an absolute and uncontrolled
proprietor of its streets, rent which is, like toll, a demand of
proprietorship, and not like a tax a 'demand of sovereignty'
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-was declared to be within the power of the city to exact.
Meridian occupies a different attitude as to its streets and
its power over them. All the power which it has over its
streets is derived from the legislature, whose power over
them is 'supreme and transcendent.' "
Second. The Supreme Court said, in the Western Union
case, that the Western Union Telegraph Company was a
foreign corporation and could not claim advantages under
Section 3326, giving telegraph and telephone companies the
right to use the public highways and streets of the state.
IV.
The power to license, tax and regulate may be exercised in
two separate and distinct ways; first, under police power for
the purpose of police regulation; and a license tax under
this power is generally known as a regulatory tax; second,
under the taxing power, for the purpose of raising revenue.
The tax is usually an occupation tax or for the privilege of
doing business within a community. Whether a given tax
is a regulatory tax or a tax for the purpose of raising rev-
enue, cannot always be determined from the particular or-
dinance assessing the tax.
In City of Lamar v. Adams (1901), 90 Mo. App. 40, the
Court said:
"It has been seen that the tax required by said ordinance
is a license tax. The imposition of such a tax may be refer-
able to the taxing power, the police power, or both; to the
police power alone if the object is merely to regulate and
the amount received merely pays the expense of enforcing
the regulations, and to the taxing power alone if its main
object is revenue. * * * We are bound to know that
the license fee of fifteen dollars exacted of each insurance
company is far in excess of the reasonable expense of en-
foroement of any regulation, and hence we must conclude
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that the main object of the tax was revenue. * * * Such
license fee is nothing more nor less than an occupation tax
imposed for revenue. * * It is thus seen that by the
express terms of the plaintiff's charter the power is con-
ferred to not only license but to tax. And under this power
the plaintiff was authorized to levy and collect a tax for rev-
enue by way of a license, unless the exercise of that author-
ity is taken away or forbidden by some other provision of
law. Collections of words to be found in other statutes sim-
ilar to that employed in plaintiff's charter have been held to
confer the power to tax for revenue."
In City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 474, affirmed
70 Mo. Sup. Ct. 562, the Court said:
"The substance, not the form of the tax is to be regarded
in ascertaining whether the tax is upon property or upon a
privilege conected with property. The tax under consider-
ation is a license tax. The imposition of such a tax may be
referred to the taxing power or to the police power of the
State,-to either or to both; to the police power alone if the
object is merely to regulate, and the amount received merely
pays the expenses of enforcing the regulations, and to the
taxing power alone of its main object is revenue."
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made
the same assertions in considering license tax cases arising
out of interstate commerce. This question is taken up in an-
other part of this note, but the following additional authori-
ties are cited in support of the statement made:
Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130
Mo. 600; St. Joseph v. Ernst, 95 Mo. 360; St. Louis v. Stern-
burg, 69 Mo. 289; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 8 Mo. App. 478; Stt.
Louis v. Boatmen's Ins. & Tr. Co., 47 Mo. 153; Kansas City
v. Corrigan, 18 Mo. App. 206; Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v.
Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; Williams v. Talladiga, 226 U. S.
404; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Seay, 132 U. S. 472; 2 Inter. Com. Rep.
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726, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161; 4 Inter. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1094; Postal lel. & Cable Co. v. RBichmod, 249 U. S.
252.
V.
License taxes for the purpose of raising reve'uz and as
regulatory mea~sures can be imposed upon property used in
interstate commerce, but such a tax will not be upheld where
it constitutes a serious burden upon interstate commerce.
(a) Mhere a carrier is engaged in interstate commerce,
all business done locally within a state is subject to a license
tax for the purpose of raising revenue where the business
is of such a substantial amount that it does not appear as a
disguised attempt to burden interstate commerce.
In Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 257,
63 L. Ed. 594, a license tax of $300 a year was imposed upon
the company for the privilege of doing business in the city
of Richmond. The Court said:
"The principle of these cases, and of many others cited in
the opinions, is that, as against Federal constitutional limi-
tations of power, a state may lawfully impose a license tax,
restricted, as it is in this case, to the right to do local busi-
ness within its borders, where such tax does not burden, or
discriminate against interstate business, and where the local
business purporting to be taxed, again as in this case, is so
substantial in amount that it does not clearly appear that
the tax is a disguised attempt to tax interstate commerce.
Such a tax is not, as is argued, an insp-ction measure, lim-
ited in amount to the cost of issuing the license or supervis-
ing the business, but is an exercise of the police power of
the state for revenue purposes, restricted to internal com-
merce, and therefore within the taxing power of the state."
In Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Charleston et al., 38 L. Ed.
873, the Court said:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss3/5
ST. LOUIS LAW EBVIEW,
"We do not deem it necessary to discuss the contention
that the ordinance imposing the license tax in question is in-
valid by reason of its disregard of provisions of the consti-
tution of South Carolina. The Supreme Court of that state
has, in several cases, judicially settled that the power to raise
revenue by a license tax on business, given by statute to the
city council of Charleston, does not violate any provision of
the state constitution. State v. Hayne, 4 S. C. 413; Informa-
tion v. Jager, 29 S. C. 443."
In Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 419, 57 L. Ed. 281, an
ordinance had been passed imposing upon the company a
license tax of $100 annually and declared that it had been
enacted in exercise of the police power of the city as well
as for the purpose of raising revenue. The Court said:
"We have, then, an ordinance which taxes without exemp-
tion, the privilege of carrying on a business a part of which
is that of a governmental agency constituted under a law of
the United States and engaged in an essential part of the
public business,-communication between the officers and
departments of the Federal government. The ordinance,
making no exception of this class of business, necessarily
includes its transaction within the privilege tax levied. This
part of the license exacted necessarily affects the whole, and
makes the tax unconstitutional and void."
Additional authorities cited are:
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Alabama Board of Assessment,
132 U. S. 372, 33 L. Ed. 409; Allen v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,
191 U. S. 171, 48 L. Ed. 134; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32
L. Ed. 311.
The form of the tax just discussed is in the nature of an
occupation tax and is enacted for the privilege of doing busi-
ness within a municipality. The amount of this tax appar-
ently depends on the discretion of the city councils, and it
160.-
Washington University Open Scholarship
POWER OF -UICIPALITIES TO TAX TELEPHONE COLIPANIES. 161
further sems obvious it will only be set aside when it can be
established to the satisfaction of the court that the tax in
question is a serious burden on interstate commerce.
(b) A license tax as a regulatory tax imposed under local
government supervision upon property used in interstate com-
merce.
A license tax may be imposed upon the mainteance or poles
and wires within a city, although the poles are used entirely
to transmit messages in interstate commerce.
In Mackay Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U. S. 99,
100, 63 L. Ed. 869, the Court said:
"That a reasonable tax upon the maintenance of poles and
wires erected and maintained by a telegraph company within
the limits of a city, pursuant to authority granted by its or-
dinances, is not an unwarranted burden upon interstate or
foreign commerce, or upon the functions of the company as
an agency of the government, and does not infringe rights con-
ferred by the Act of Congress, is so thoroughly settled by
previous decisions of this court that no further discussion is
called for."
In Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 258, 63
L. Ed. 594, the Court said:
"There remains to be considered the fee, as it is called in
thv ordinance imposing it, of $2 for each pole maintained or
used in the streets of the city of Richmond. This character
of tax has also been the subject of definite decision by this
court, and has been sustained where not clearly shown to be
a direct burden upon interstate commerce or unreasonable in
amount, having regard to the purpose for which it may law-
fully be imposed."
In Western Union Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 426,
47 L. Ed. 244, the Court said:
"This license fee was not a tax on the property of the corn-
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pany, or oi its transmission of messages, or on ifs receipts
from Euch transmission, or on its occupation or business, but
was a charge in the enforcement of local governmental super-
vision, and ag such not in itself obnoxious to the clause of the
Constitution relied on."
Other cases sustaining regulatory license taxes are -
Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. w. Baltimore, 156 U. S. 210, 39
L. Ed. 399; Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 19a
U. S. 160, 163, 47 L. Ed. 995, 999; Western Union Teleg. Co.
v. Pa. R. R. Co., 195 U. S. 540, 566, 49 L. Ed. 312, 321.
It is, however, to be noted in the case of Postal Teleg. &
Cable Co. v. Richmond, supra, that while the Court states that
"Even interstate commerce must pay its way," it says fur-
ther along in the opinion:
"There is no disposition on the part of this court to modify
in the least the law as it has been stated in many oases, that
'neither licenses, nor indirect taxation of any kind, nor any
system of state regulation, can be imposed upon interstate
any more than upon foreign commerce; and that all acts of
legislation producing any such result are to that extent un-
constitutional and void.' Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47, 62, 35 L. Ed. 649, 654, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Western U.
Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 190."
(c) It must clearly appear that the license tax is imposing
a serious burden upon interstate commerce and where it is
in the nature of an occupation tax under the exercise of the
taxing power for the purpose of raising revenue, it will be
held invalid where the evidence is clear and convincing that
the receipts from intrastate business are insufficient to pay
the tax and resort must be had from receipts from interstate
business if the payment is compelled.
In Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Richmond, supra, the Court
said;
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"This requirement that the appellant shall engage in in-
trastate business, construed with the ordinance imposing the
license tax, results, it is argued, in imposing a burden upon
its interstate business, for the reason that the net receipts
from its intrastate business are insufficient to pay the tax, and
therefore payment, if compelled, must be made from inter-
state receipts. If the facts were as thus asserted, it well
might be that this tax would be invalid."
The following authorities are cited as further sustaining
this proposition:
Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420, 47 L. Ed. 877; Wil-
liam.,; v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 57 L. Ed. 275, 280.
Whether the license tax imposed by a municipality upon the
maintenance of poles and wires will be valid, depends upon
whether (to use the language of the Court in Postal Teleg.
& Cable Co. v. Richmond) under the conditions prevailing in
a given case the charge made is reasonably apportionate to the
services to be rendered and the liabilities involved, or whether
it is an attempt to impose a burden on interstate commerce.
VII.
The reasonableness of the license tax.
(a) The reasonableness of a regulatory tax is determined
by the cost of local government supervision, and can only be
determined from a study made to show the cost the city is
put to in making inspections, supervising the placing of con-
struction, issuing permits and giving police protection gen-
erally. The following decisions indicate the amounts of reg-
ulatory license taxes which have been sustained in various
localities:
Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Richmond, supra. For each
pole maintained in the streets of Richmond, $2.00 payable
annually.
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Mackey Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 64 L. Ed. 863. For
each pole maintained in the city limits, whether on railroad
right of way or not, 50 cents payable annually.
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Richmnond, 56 L. Ed. 710. A
license tax of $2.00 per pole and $2.00 per wire mile, payable
annually, was found not an unreasonable tax.
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 47 L.
Ed. 240. A license tax of $1.00 per pole and $2.50 per wire
mile was sustained as not obnoxious, but reference should be
made to Postal Teleg. &, Cable Co. v. New Hope, 48 L. Ed.
339, where the same license tax was submitted to a jury and
found unreasonable in the lower court and affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Chester City v. Western Union Teleg. Co. (Pa.), 25 At.
1134. A license tax of $1.00 per pole payable annually found
reasonable.
Allentown v. Western U. Teleg. Co. (Pa.), 143 Atl. 1070.
A license tax of $1.00 per pole found reasonable.
St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 37 L. Ed. 380, 37 L. Ed.
812. A charge of $5.00 per pole was held to be in the nature
of a rental charge and not a privilege or license tax. On a
new trial ordered in the case the ordinance was held void for
unreasonableness because enormously greater than the rental
value of abutting property and greatly disproportionate to
the value of the poles and wires. See case of St. Louis v.
Western U. Teleg. Co., 63 Fed. 68.
Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 39 L. Ed. 399. A
license tax of $2.00 per pole payable annually was sustained.
THE FOLLOWING REGULATORY LICENSE TAXES
HAVE BEEN FOUND UNREASONABLE.
Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 48 L4.
Pd. 339. License tax held unreasonable and void where evi-
dence was introduced showing the charges were ten times more
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than all kinds and character of expense and liability which
might have been incurred by the Borough. The amount of
the tax was $1.00 per pole and $2.50 per wire mile payable
annually. The question was submitted to a jury.
Postal Teleg. & Ca le Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 48 L. Ed.
342. Evidence showed license tax was twenty times more
than the amount incurred by the city by reason of such main-
tenance and was held void. The question was submitted to a
jury. The amount of the license tax was $1.00 per pole
and $2.50 per wire mile payable annually.
Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 47 L. Ed. 1002.
A license tax of $1.00 per pole and $2.50 per wire mile was
found unreasonable.
Saginaw v. Swift Elect. Co. (Mich. Sup. Ct.), 72 N. W. 6,
An ordinance making an inspection charge of 50 cents per
annum for each pole was unreasonable where actual cost of
inspection was about 5 cents per pole.
In every case where a license tax of this nature has been
found unreasonable, evidence showing that the license tax
was greatly in excess of local government supervision was
introduced, and the question of the reasonableness of the
tax submitted to a jury, or it was found that the license tax
was made oppressive for the purpose of forcing a company
with overhead wires to go underground, and therefore, un-
reasonable.
(b) The reasonableness of license taxes for the purpose of
raising revenue.
Where the license tax is in exercise of the taxing power of
the state for revenue purposes, the decisions do not indicate
a mathematical basis upon which to predicate the reasonable-
ness of the tax. One difficulty is that in a large number of
cases the ordinances levying the license tax state that it is
both for the purpose of local government supervision and for
the purpose of raising revenue. The tax for revenue pur-
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poses is usually found to be an occupation tax and can be
distinguished in this manner from license taxes or fees for
police regulation.
(1) The tax must not be so large that it amounts to pro-
hibition as it has been repeatedly held the power of pro-
hibition cannot be used to supress useful occupations.
In Missouri, the rule as expressed in the City of Springfield
v. Jacobs, 101 Mo. App. 339, is that the courts will refuse to
enforce and will declare the ordinance void when it is clearly
shown that it is unjust, oppressive or unreasonable. The
Court said:
"Among the powers specifically delegated to a city of the
third class is, authority to levy and collect a license tax on
traveling and auction stores; it is worthy of remark, however,
that the measure of control over such callings is expressly
restricted to the imposition and collection of a license tax and
is not extended to the broader prerogatives of regulation and
suppression conferred and possessed, respecting the numerous
callings enumerated in the succeeding paragraph of the
statute, by which the authority of regulation or suppression
may be exercised additional to licensing and taxing. The
bounds within which a municipal corporation can lawfully en-
force such delegated powers, as well as the limits within
which the courts will interfere with such civic legislation, and
refuse to enforce such enactments, are now well defined, and
while courts will not disturb the legitimate exercise of the
legislative power accorded a municipality, they will avert its
abuse. A city ordinance is to be deemed prima facie valid,
but the discretion of a city council is not absolute and its
authority must be properly exercised. While the subject of
the enactment may be within the statutory powers, courts will
refuse to enforce it and will declare it void where it is unjust,
oppressive or unreasonable, but whether the ground upon
which the assault is made be that the ordinance impugne-]
would operate unreasonably or oppressively, a clear case
must be presented to warrant a court in annulling its effect."
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Further along in the opinion the Judge said:
"The purpose aimed at in its enactment was not to require
the amount of the license as a fair share of the public burdens
to be borne by those engaged in the callings named, but the
actual object of this piece of civic legislation was evidently
the absolute prohibition from and annihilation within the
limits of Springfield of all such transient or traveling estab-
lishments or means of livelihood, by requiring as a prere-
quisite to their lawful existence the payment of an extrava-
gant and exorbitant per diem under the pretext of a license
tax. Such arbitrary exercise and abuse of the authority del-
egated can not be countenanced, and the judgment of the
lower court is affirmed."
In McCray v. United States, 49 L. Ed. 94, the Court said, in
speaking of the license tax of 10 cents per pound imposed for
revenue purposes by an act of Congress on the manufacture
of oleomargarine:
"Whilst it is true-so the argument proceeds-that Con-
gress, in exerting the taxing power conferred upon it, may
use all means appropriate to the exercise of such power, a tax
which is fixed at such a high rate as to suppress the produc-
tion of the article taxed is not a legitimate means to the law-
ful end, and is therefore beyond the scope of the taxing
power."
But it was further stated, in the instance of taxing oleo-
margarine:
"That the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargar-
ine may be prohibited by a free government without a vio-
lation of fundamental rights."
In Westenr U. Teleg. Co. v. Seay, 33 L. Ed. 409, a license
tax of 2% had been levied by the state of Alabama on the
gross receipts of the company payable annually. Since the
tax was placed on revenue from interstate business as well as
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intrastate, the act creating the tax was held invalid, but the
right to assess a 2% license tax on gross receipts by the state
on intrastate business alone, was not questioned.
rn Postal Teteg. d Cable Co. v. C'harleston Gity Council, 39
L. Ed. 871, a license tax of $500 payable annually was placed
by ordinance of the city of Charleston on the company for
the privilege of doing business in the city of Charleston.
It was contended thaf the office established by the company
was just the initial point for receiving and sending messages
and no messages were sent between points within the city-.
Using Charleston as an originating and terminating point,
both an intrastate and interstate business was done. The
tax was sustained.
In Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Richmond, an annual license
tax of $300 was imposed upon the company by ordinance for
the privilege of doing business within the city of Richmond.
Tn this case the interstate business was excluded by the or-
dinance. The tax was sustained.
In Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114 a 2% an-
nual license tax was imposed by the state on the gross receipts
of the company and others handling oils, etc. This tax was
for revenue purposes and was held not to be unreasonable
and not in contravention of the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Nebraska Tel. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 82 Neb. 59, an
annual license tax of 1% of gross earnings each year for five
years, 2% of the gross earnings each year for the next five
years, and 3% of the gross earnings annually thereafter dur-
ing the remaining period granted by the ordinance was up-
held.
In addition to this tax, an annual license tax of $500 was
imposed and upheld by the court on the theory that it was
in the nature of a rental charge.
In Lincoln Traction Co. v. City of Lincoln, 84 Neb. 327, an
ordinance was upheld as not unreasonable requiring all street
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railway companies maintaining a street railway system in
the city of Lincoln to pay as an occupation tax annually 5%
of their gross receipts.
In St. Louis v. United Rwys., 263 Mo. 457, a license tax of
one mill for each pay passenger, or equivalent to 2% upon the
gross receipts, was held not to be unreasonable.
(2) Where no provision of the constitution is abridged,
the reasonableness of a license tax for revenue purposes is a
question for legislative and not judicial determination.
When the license tax for revenue does not amount to a sup-
pression of the business, the law-making power is the sole
judge of its reasonableness and it is not a question for jud-
icial interference, since the power to impose license taxes
for revenue is derived solely from the taxing power and the
taxing power is exercised alone by the law-making bodies. It
has become a principle of law that a court will not substitute
its judgment of the reasonableness of a revenue tax for that
of a legislative body where no restriction is found in the con-
stitution.
In St. Louis v. United Rwys., supra, the Court, with ref-
erence to the one mill passenger tax, said:
"If power exists in a municipal corporation to enact an
ordinance, as we have shown existed here, the court will be
slow to interfere with its operative force. The charter of a
city has the force of legislative enactment, and nothing but the
most indubitable case of unfairness and oppression in an
ordinance will warrant a court in interfering with its enforce-
ment. (Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 220, 223; Kansas
City v. Trieb, 76 Mo. App. 478; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 8 Mo.
App. 478, 482; Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 1. c. 513.)
Besides, municipal corporations are primarily the sole
judges of the necessity of ordinances, and the courts are,
therefore, loth to review their unreasonableness, if passed, as
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss3/5
ST. LOU1s LAW IEVTEW
was the ordinance in question, in strict conformity with an
express grant. (Art. 3, sec. 26, subdiv. 11, Charter St. Louis;
Art. 10, Charter of St. Louis.) This ordinance having been
passed by virtue of express pover cannot be set aside by the
courts for mere unreasonableness, because questions as to
the expediency and wisdom of its enactment rest alone with
the law-making power. (Skinker v. Ifeman, 148 fo. 349,
355; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; Coal-Float v. Jeffer-
sonville, 112 id. 15.)"
In Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433, 19 L. Ed. 95, re-
ferring to the unlimited nature of the power of taxation con-
ferred upon Congress, it was said:
"Congress may prescribe the basis, fix the rates, and re-
quire payment as it may deem proper. Within the limits
of the Constitution it is supreme in its action. No power
of supervision or control is lodged in either of the other de-
partments of the government."
After calling attention to the express limitations as to uni-
formity and articles exported from any state, the Court con-
tinued:
"With these exceptions, the exercise of the power is, in all
respects, unfettered."
In McCray v. United States, 49 L. Ed. 99, the Court said,
in discussing the tax of 10 cents per pound imposed by Act of
Congress upon the manufacture of oleomargarine and the
applicability of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Con-
stitution to the Act:
"That provision, as we have previously said, does not with-
draw or expressly limit the grant of power to tax conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution. From this it follows,
as we have also previously declared, that the judiciary is
without authority to avoid an act of Congress exerting the
taxing power, even in a case where, to the judicial mind, it
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seems that Congress had, in putting such power in motion,
abused its lawful authority by levying a tax which was unwise
or oppressive, or the result of the enforcement of which
might be to indirectly affect subjects not within the powers
delegated to Congress."
The proposition that the reasonableness of a tax imposed
for revenue alone is a matter for determination by the legis-
lative branch of the municipal government, is supported by
great weight of authority.
Southern Car Co. v. State, 32 So. (Ala.) 235; John Rapp &,
Son v. Kiel, 115 Pac. (Cal.), 651; U. S. Dis. Co. v. Chicago,
1 N. E. (II1.), 166; Burlington v. Putman Ins. Co., 31 Ia.
102; In re Martin, 64 Pac. (Kan.), 43; Mason v. Lancaster,
4 Bush., 406; Mason v. Cumberland, 48 AtI. (Md.), 136;
People v. Grant, 121 N. W. (Mich.), 300; St. Paul v. Colter,
12 Minn. 41; Springfield v. Jacobs, 73 S. W. (Mo.), 1097;
Johnson v. Asbury, 33 Atl. (N. J.), 580; State v. Robertson,
48 S. E. (N. C.), 595; Hirschfield v. Dallas, 15 S. W. (Tex.),
124; Odgen v. Crossman, 53 Pac. (Utah), 985; State v. Har-
rington, 35 Ati. (Ver.), 515; Stull v, DeMattos, 62 Pac.
(Wash.), 451; Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, 11 D. 0. 250.
JAmEs J. MILLGAN, '21.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss3/5
/ I$ *I4SW
Washington University Open Scholarship
